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STATEMENTS SHOWING JURISDICTION. ISSUES PRESENTED, 
AND DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Appellants' statements related to jurisdiction, issues presented for appellate 
review, and the determinative legal provisions are accurate and complete. Appellees do 
not dispute the standards of review and legal standards that Appellants set forth for each 
discrete appellate issue. Appellees adopt the content of each respective section. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL 
1. On May 1, 1991, Elmer Ellsworth ("Elmer") and Barbara Ellsworth ("Barbara") 
executed a Trust Agreement that created The Ellsworth Family Trust (hereinafter "EFT") 
and named both Elmer and Barbara as primary beneficiaries. (R. at 628,1086.) 
2. Elmer and Barbara retained attorney Steven Skabelund to assist them in the 
preparation and execution of EFT. (R. at 1682.) 
3. EFT named Elmer's seven biological children (including Mark Ellsworth) and 
Barbara's three biological children (including Terry Huffstatler) as its contingent 
beneficiaries. (R. at 1681.) 
4. EFT contains the following provision: 
The Trustors have transferred to the Trustees ... the property described in 
Schedules A, B, and Care or will be attached hereto. The properties 
transferred, unless otherwise designated, shall be beneficially owned by the 
Trustors - 50% as to each Truster for his or her separate benefit- and shall 
be listed on Schedule "A." Properties for which Elmer A. Ellsworth is sole 
beneficial owner shall be listed in Schedule "B" and properties for which 
Barbara May Ellsworth is the sole beneficial owner shall be listed in 
Schedule "C." ... All property initially or hereafter transferred to the trust, 
including property passing to the trust by either of the Trustors' Wills, 
hereinafter is termed the "Trust Estate." 
(R. at 628, 1086.) 
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5. Neither Truster ever filled out Schedule A, and Elmer did not fill out a Schedule 
B. (R. at 627, 1086.) 
6. Despite not listing the transferred property on Schedule A, on May 1, 1991 Elmer 
and Barbara executed a Warranty Deed that transferred two parcels of property-the 
marital home and a 6-plex-to EFT. (R. at 627, 1085.) 
7. After Elmer's death, an investment account at Wedbush Securities, Inc. was 
created to be held by Barbara, as the Trustee of EFT. (R. at 627, 1085.) 
Facts relevant to Issue 1: 
8. There is no written document that memorializes the transfer of any other property 
into EFT. (R. at 627, 1085-6.) 
9. No schedule exists in which Elmer ever listed or identified any precious metals as 
his personal property. (R. at 627, 1085.) 
10. EFT also includes the following provision: 
7.1 Family Trust: Lifetime Distributions. (a) During the lifetime of the 
surviving Trustor, the Trustee shall pay to or apply for the benefit of the 
Surviving Truster the entire net income of the Family Trust, in quarterly or 
more frequent installments. In addition, if the Trustee deems the net income 
to be insufficient for the reasonable support and maintenance of the 
Surviving Trustor, the Trustee shall pay to or apply for his or her benefit as 
much of the principal of the Family Trust as the Trustee, in the Trustee's 
discretion, deems necessary for such limited purposes. 
(b) In any calendar year the Trustee shall also pay over to the Surviving 
Trustor from the principal of this Family Trust such amounts as the 
Surviving Trustor shall request in writing [subject to specific limitations set 
forth within this section]. 
(R. at 627-8, 1084-5.) 
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11. On May 1, 1991, Elmer also executed a Last Will and Testament. (R. at 626, 
1084.) 
12. The Will was notarized contemporaneously with this execution. (R. at 626, 1084.) 
13. Within the Will, Elmer stated: "[i]f my spouse survives me, I give to her all 
items of Personal Property (as hereinafter defined)." (R. at 626, 1084.) 
14. The term "Personal Property" is not defined within the Will. (R. at 626, 1084.) 
15. There is no Memorandum of Disposition signed by Elmer that references any 
precious metals. (R. at 626, 1084.) 
16. After Elmer and Barbara Ellsworth married, they purchased and stored precious 
metals that had been acquired in a safe in the marital home. (R. at 626.) 
17. At the time that Elmer passed away in 2003, Terry Huffstatler participated in the 
creation of a written inventory of the precious metals in the safe. (R. at 626, 1681.) 
18. On December 15, 2012, Terry Huffstatler prepared a second inventory of the 
precious metals stored in the safe. (R. at 626, 1084.) 
19. Barbara also stored precious metals in a safety deposit box at the Bank of 
American Fork; the precious metals stored in this safety deposit box were not included in 
the December 15, 2012 inventory. (R. at 625, 1084.) 
20. Soon after completing the inventory on December 15, 2012, Terry Huffstatler and 
her husband-Jim Huffstatler-rented two safety deposit boxes at a Bank of American 
Fork branch located in Pleasant Grove to store all of the inventoried precious metal. (R. 
at 625, 1083-4.) 
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21. Upon renting the boxes, Terry Huffstatler and Mark Ellsworth removed the 
inventoried precious metals ( other than specific junk silver) from the safe located in 
Barbara's home and transported them to the bank and placed the metals in the safety 
deposit boxes. (R. at 625, 1083.) 
22. Despite believing that all of the precious metal and coins were Barbara's personal 
property, Terry Huffstatler identified herself as the "signer" for access to the safety 
deposit boxes and designated Mark Ellsworth as the individual that "could hold the 
keys." (R. at 625.) 
23. Terry Huffstatler did this "so that we could try to cooperate with each other" and 
"not create any feud." (R. at 625, 1083.) 
24. Throughout Elmer's and Barbara's marriage, they also stored old silver coins that 
the parties called 'Junk silver" in the safe located in the marital home. (R. at 625, 1083.) 
25. In January 2013, Mark Ellsworth, Andrew Ellsworth, Terry Huffstatler, Keith 
Baker, and Karl Baker all met at Barbara Ellsworth's residence (her marital home before 
Elmer Ellsworth died) and they counted all of this junk silver and divided it in equal 
portions, one portion of which was to be given to each of the children of Elmer or 
Barbara. (R. at 624, 1083.) 
26. Elmer's Will was never probated (R. at I 067.) 
Facts relevant to Issue 2: 
27. After Elmer died in 2003, Barbara became both the sole trustee and the primary 
beneficiary of EFT. (R. at 1681.) 
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28. EFT named Mark Ellsworth and Terry Huffstatler as co-trustees to administer EFT 
and manage its assets if Barbara ever resigned as EFT' s trustee ( or was otherwise 
removed). (R. at 1916, Exhibit 1, p. 35.) 
29. As the primary beneficiary, Barbara was entitled to receive the entire net income 
and as much of the principal of EFT as was necessary for her support and maintenance. 
(R. at 1681.) 
30.After Elmer died, Barbara began to rely more and more on Terry Huffstatler for 
her care and for assistance with the daily tasks of living. (R. at 1681.) 
31. Terry's responsibilities for and assistance to Barbara increased significantly after 
Barbara fell and suffered serious injuries (including a hip fracture). (R. at 1679.) 
32. The Ellsworth siblings (Elmer's biological children) were aware of Terry's 
involvement in caring for and assisting Barbara; through March 2013, the Ellsworth 
siblings welcomed Terry's access to and close collaboration with Barbara. (R. at 1679.) 
33. To help facilitate Terry's role, Barbara visited Steven Skabelund (the same 
attorney that assisted Barbara and Elmer in drafting EFT in 1991) for advice; Mr. 
Skabelund advised Barbara to sign an updated power of attorney document that would 
allow Terry to act for Barbara in all of her personal affairs. (R. at 1678-79.) 
34.Barbara signed the updated power of attorney in December 2012. (R. at 1678.) 
35. In early March 2013, Barbara had decided that she wanted to sell the marital 
home; Terry met with Mark and informed him of that decision, and she also told him 
about the December power of attorney that Barbara had signed. (R. at 1678.) 
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36. Rather than accept Barbara's decision, Mark told Terry that he wanted to discuss 
Barbara's desire to sell the marital home with his siblings. (R. at 1678.) 
37. Soon after the meeting, on iv1arch 13, 2013, fv1ark sent Terry an email in which he 
stated that Barbara "is not in a condition to manage the fiscal affairs of the trust," asserted 
that Terry was "handling [Barbara's] fiscal affairs,'' requested that Barbara sign an 
official resignation as trustee, and took the position that Barbara had already "defaulted" 
her position as trustee by signing the December 2012 power of attorney document. (R. at 
1677.) 
38. Terry told Barbara about the email that Mark had sent; after Barbara found out 
about the email, Barbara requested to meet with Mr. Skabelund. (R. at 1677 .) 
39. Barbara met with Mr. Skabelund the next day, and she told Mr. Skabelund that she 
wanted to create a new trust. (R. at 1677.) 
40. Mr. Skabelund also reviewed the email that Mark had sent to Terry. (R. at 1912, 
pgs. 158:22-159:9.) 
41. During his consultation with Barbara, Barbara told him that "she wanted different 
distribution provisions upon her death ... because she felt she was being treated unfairly 
by the Ellsworth children" and that "she wanted to know what she could do to make sure 
more of the assets went to her children rather than the Ellsw011h children." (R. at 1912, 
pgs. 15 8: 14-23; 160: 1-5.) 
42. Based upon his personal consultations with Barbara, Mr. Skabelund drafted an 
updated set of estate planning documents for Barbara, including a will, an updated power 
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of attorney document, and the Barbara May Ellsworth Trust; these documents resulted in 
a transfer of 50% ofEFT's property to the Barbara May Ellsworth Trust. (R. at 1676-7.) 
43. On March 19, 2013, Barbara visited Dr. Sean Curzon, D.O. to check on the 
progress of her previously-broken hip and to determine whether she was able to make 
self-care directives and participate in an overall understanding of surroundings, and 
ability to participate in the decision making process. (R. at 1666-7.) 
44. Dr. Curzon was Barbara's treating physician and had been seeing Barbara since 
February 23, 2009. (R. at 1916, Exhibit 63, May 16, 2014 deposition, pgs. 10:13-11 :19.) 
45. After examining Barbara on March 19, Dr. Curzon noted that "at this point, 
[Barbara] should be able to still manage her legal affairs" and also that Barbara was, at 
that time, "overall still able to understand conversations and [be] an active participant in 
her care." (R. at 1666.) 
46. When asked whether Barbara "had her full faculties at" the time that she met with 
Mr. Skabelund in March 2013, Mr. Skabelund stated "I believe so, yes." (R. at 1912, p. 
161 :20-24.) 
4 7. Later that day, Barbara met again with Mr. Skabelund and, at that time, signed the 
Barbara May Ellsworth Trust documents that Mr. Skabelund had prepared. (R. at 1676.) 
48. The trial court made a specific factual finding that, "on March 19, 2013 ... 
Barbara knew who her children and step-children were, knew the objects of her bounty, 
and knew how she wanted to dispose of her bounty." (R. at 1665.) 
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49. The trial court also found that, "even where Barbara may have had confusion ... 
the evidence clearly established that she knew she had a house, that she owned the six-
plex, and knew of the existence of the investment account." (R. at 1665.) 
50. The trial court's explanation of the evidence presented at trial included the 
following statement: "there is simply no showing of undue influence" and "there has 
been no showing that [the relationship between Terry and Barbara] overcame Barbara's 
own wishes as to her plans for distribution of her estate or in any "'ay interfered with her 
appreciation of the property she owned or to whom she might give it upon her death." (R. 
at 1658-9.) 
51. The trial court also addressed the "presumption of undue influence," stating that 
"the trial testimony and evidence has dispelled the presumption of undue influence." (R. 
at 1658.) 
52. The trial court identified the fo11owing evidence that Appellees presented at trial 
that dispelled the presumption of undue influence: 
a. "Barbara's trust documents were prepared with the assistance of her 
attorney Mr. Skabelund;" 
b. "[T]he new estate plan reflected Barbara's own wishes;" and 
c. "Barbara had her own personal motivations to create the estate plan because 
she was upset with Mark and others of the Ellsworth children." 
(R. at 1658.) 
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SUMMARY OF APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1: Elmer's Will was not ambiguous, and the Court correctly interpreted the 
Will's language. Furthermore, Appellants have failed to present a viable alternative 
interpretation of the Will's language and have not identified any extrinsic evidence that 
the trial court could have used ( or that this Court could reference) to support an 
alternative interpretation of the Will. The trial court's entry of partial summary judgment 
was correct, and this Court should affirm the trial court's decision. 
ISSUE 2: Appellants' speculative theory that Barbara was subject to undue 
influence because Terry did not give her Mark's March 13, 2013 email does not satisfy 
the high burden that Appellants face to overcome the deference that this Court shows to 
the trial court's factual findings. Appellants have not attempted to marshal the evidence 
to demonstrate that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous, and the alternative 
theory that they advance is directly contradicted by the evidence presented at trial. There 
is no basis for disturbing the trial court's findings of fact, and this Court should affirm 
those findings. 
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ARGUMENT 
Appellants' Issue 1 argument, that Elmer's Will is ambiguous, is essentially a 
reargument of their opposition to the Court's entry of summary judgment as to ownership 
of the precious metals. Appellants failed to present any genuine issues of fact or viable 
legal arguments to the trial court that would have prevented entry of summary judgment. 
Their appeal faces the same deficiency. Appellants have presented no basis for this Court 
to reverse the trial court's entry of partial summary judgment regarding the o-wnership of 
the precious metals. 
Appellants' Issue 2 argument seeks to replace the trial court's well-supported and 
well-explained factual findings with a speculative theory that is contradicted by the 
evidence presented at trial. Appellants have not marshaled the evidence to support their 
position that the Court's finding that the Barbara May Ellsworth Trust was procured 
through undue influence. Because of this failure, Appellants have not met their high 
burden of persuasion and this Court should uphold and affin11 the trial court's ultimate 
decision to uphold and enforce the Barbara May Ellsworth Trust provisions. 
I. ELMER ELLSWORTH'S WILL IS NOT AMBIGUOUS AND DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION THAT APPELLANTS 
SEEK TO APPLY. 
There is no language within Elmer's Will that transferred Elmer's personal 
property to EFT ( or within EFT that could have accepted a non-specific and, ultimately, a 
non-probated transfer). Review of EFT's provisions (which includes very specific 
directives regarding the process for making property part of its corpus) and the 
undisputed facts related to Elmer's and Barbara's treatment and storage of the precious 
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metals 1 confirms that the precious metals sought by Appellants never were property of 
EFT. Appellants are unable to identify any viable factual or legal justification to claim 
that any of the precious metals ever became an asset of EFT; the trial court's entry of 
partial summary judgment must stand. 
A. I11e terms of Elmer's Will and EFT are not anibiguous. 
First, Appellants concede that the trial court applied the correct legal standard to 
its review of EFT' s and the Will's provisions-that "general rules of construction of 
written instruments apply to the construction of trust instruments." Makoff v. Makoff, 528 
P.2d 797, 798 (Utah 1974); see also Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, ~ 7, 169 P.3d 750 
(applying principles of contract construction and interpretation to a trust agreement). 
Appellants failed to analyze the language of EFT and its gatekeeping provisions that 
govern how property was to be conveyed to it. Also, the trial court correctly interpreted 
and applied Elmer's Will in accordance with the specific language set forth within the 
document. See In re Ashton, 804 P .2d 540, 542 (Utah 1990) (stating that a court, "[i]n 
construing a will ... must look to the testator's intent as expressed in the will"). 
Elmer's Will clearly states: "[i]f my spouse survives me, I give to her all items of 
Personal Property." (R. at 626, 1084.) This statement is unequivocal-upon Elmer 
Ellsworth's death, Barbara Ellsworth was to receive all of Elmer Ellsworth's personal 
property. The only exception to this requirement is if the personal property were listed on 
a Memorandum of Disposition of Personal Property and that Memorandum included 
1 Elmer and Barbara did not attempt to follow any of EFT' s directives when dealing with 
the ownership of the precious metals. 
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Elmer's signature and the identity of the intended recipient of the specified personal 
property. No such Memorandum exists. 
The trial court correctly ruled that there could be no dispute that any precious 
metals that Elmer Ells\vorth owned prior to his death (whether he held sole ownership or 
shared ownership with Barbara) were part of the personal property category of items that 
passed to Barbara Ellsworth when Elmer Ellswortp. died. Elmer did not sign a 
Memorandum of Disposition of Personal Property (and so the precious metals could not 
have been transferred to someone else). Precious metals are, undoubtedly, tangible 
personal property. Utah law clearly states that "[a] will is construed to pass all property 
the testator owns at death." U.C.A. § 75-2-602. In his Will, Elmer stated, unequivocally, 
that Barbara was to receive all of his personal property. 
Neither Elmer nor Barbara ever listed any property on a schedule. Elmer did not 
sign a Memorandum of Disposition of Personal Property ( and so the precious metals 
could not have been transferred to someone else). In fact, the only way that either of them 
ever transferred any property into EFT was through an official, recorded deed of transfer 
(in the case of the marital home or the 6-plex) or through setting up an account that 
specifically named EFT as the trust that owns the account (in the case of the Wedbush 
Securities account). No evidence exists that Elmer or Barbara ever signed, wrote, set up, 
or otherwise documented any transfer of any precious metals ( or any other property, for 
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that matter) to EFT. The precious metals, by EFT's own, unambiguous tenns, are not part 
of EFT's specifically defined "Trust Estate."2 
The crux of Appellants' argument hinges on the otherwise undefined term 
"Personal Property'' within Elmer's Will. Appellants claim that the term, because it is 
undefined, is ambiguous (because it could be construed to convey property in two 
different ways) and that the trial court overlooked the "as hereinafter defined" 
parenthetical language within the Will. But Appellants fail to reconcile this position with 
clear Utah law that, in order for an ambiguity to exist, there must be a material facial 
deficiency in the language that creates more than one reasonable interpretation of the 
language at issue. See Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ~ 25, 190 P .3d 1269. There is no 
facial deficiency; furthermore, Appellants' argument turns the entirety of the Will on its 
head and advocates for a transfer of property to EFT that is simply unsupportable. 
L The term Personal Property is easily defined. 
First, Appellants' characterization of the undefined Personal Property fails because 
the absence of a specific definition of Personal Property is meaningless; simply because 
the term is undefined in the Will does not make it ambiguous or capable of two 
alternative meanings. See South Ridge Honieowners 'Ass 'n v. Brown, 2010 UT App 23, ~ 
1, 226 P.3d 758 (recognizing that, "[i]n interpreting contracts, the ordinary and usual 
meaning of the words used is given legal effect, which ordinary meaning is often best 
determined through standard, non-legal dictionaries"). Both the dictionary and Utah law 
2 As set forth in Relevant Fact 4 above, EFT defines the term "Trust Estate" as follows: 
All property initially or hereafter transferred to the trust, including property passing to the 
trust by either of the Trustors' Wills, hereinafter is termed the "Trust Estate." 
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define personal property, 3 there is nothing within the Will that would trigger or justify 
any alternative definition, and the property at issue for this Motion (precious metals) 
clearly is personal property. Utah law clearly states that "[a] will is construed to pass an 
property the testator owns at death." U.C.A. § 75-2-602. In his \Vill, Elmer stated, 
unequivocally, that Barbara was to receive all of his personal property. 
Plaintiffs' argument that the language "Personal Property (as hereinafter defined)" 
is language obligating Elmer Ellsworth to define the scope of the personal property that 
he intended his wife to receive at his death makes no sense when considering the \Villas 
a whole. There is no Personal Property schedule that Mr. Skabelund prepared for the 
purpose of identifying discrete items of personal property that would pass to Barbara 
Ellsworth at the time of Elmer Ellsworth's death. The term "Personal Property" was 
capitalized because it was intended to have a specific meaning that would have been 
defined "hereinafter" within the Will. The fact that the tenn was not defined does not 
open up the entire executory sentence to a free-for-all of alternative (and limiting or 
contradicting) meanings and interpretations. 
Furthermore, the trial court's ruling does not inappropriately render the phrase "as 
hereinafter defined" to be without meaning. The trial court did not render the "as 
hereinafter defined" term to be without meaning; rather, the trial court simply recognized 
3 As more fully set forth in the materials that Appellees filed in support of their Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, "personal property" is defined to include both "money" 
and "goods." U.C.A. § 68-3-12.5(17). (R. at 619, n. 4.) The Merriam-Webster dictionary 
defines "personal property" as "property other than real property consisting of things 
temporary or movable." Merriam-Webster Online Dictiona,y: http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/personal%20propertv (accessed November 19, 2015). 
14 
the obvious-the drafter of Elmer's Will made a scrivener's error and failed to include 
the definition promised by the "as hereinafter defined" language. The trial court was fully 
capable of recognizing thls scrivener's error and interpreting the Will as a matter of law. 
See Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351, ,I 19, 121 P.3d 57 (explaining that 
"[h ]armonizing conflicting or apparently ambiguous contract language before concluding 
that provisions are actually ambiguous is an important step in the hlerarchy of rules for 
contract interpretation" (emphasis added)); see also LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 
765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) (stating that "it is axiomatic that a contract should be 
interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, whlch terms 
should be given effect if it is possible to do so"). By applying the analysis required by 
Gillmor, the trial court recognized that the drafting error simply rendered the 
parenthetical utterly devoid of meaning and confirmed that the term "Personal Property'' 
had the meaning that Utah statutes and a dictionary set forth. 
11. Appellants' proffered definition is untenable in the context of the provisions of 
the Will and EFT. 
Second, Appellants' argument that the trial court could have read "I give to her all 
items of Personal Property (as hereinafter defined)" to mean that only personal property 
that Elmer specifically identified (by definition) would pass to Barbara is totally contrary 
to the clear and plain language withln the Will ( as well as the specific mechanisms within 
EFT to create the Trust Estate). Such a reading is also contrary to the contract 
interpretation analysis followed by Utah courts. When interpreting a contract, any term or 
provision (especially derivative terms within a sentence) that is in question cannot be 
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looked at in a vacuum or out of context. Rather, the trial court must "attempt to 
harmonize all of the contract's provisions and all of its tenns". KeyBank Nat 'I Ass 'n v. 
Systems West Computer Resources, inc., 2011 UT App 441, 7119, 265 P.3d 107 (intenial 
quotations and citations omitted). TrJs means that the trial court is to "examine the entire 
contract and all of its parts in relation to each other and give a reasonable construction of 
the contract as a whole to determine the parties' intent." Id. 
The Fourth section of the Will is clear: If Barbara survives Elmer, Elmer gave "to 
her all items of Personal Property." The Fifth section of the \Vill is also clear-Elmer's 
"residuary estate" is all of his interest in real and personal prope1iy which he has "not 
disposed ofbv tlte preceding provisions oft/tis WU/." (R. at 1916, Exhibit 1 at p. 11.) 
This means that the residuary estate language of the Fifth section does not apply to any 
property that was transferred to EFT during Elmer's life or to any property that was 
transferred pursuant to the Fourth section of the Will. The residuary disposition clause is 
just that-the residual provision to deal with any property that was not addressed by 
another more specific section of the Will or that had not already been transferred to EFT. 
Appellants would have this Court endow a parenthetical with a meaning that it 
was never intended to have; such an error would be far greater than the scrivener's error, 
as it would render the entire first sentence of Section 7 to be without meaning or effect 
(since there was no mechanism or schedule in the Will for Elmer to "define" the scope of 
the personal property that he desired to transfer to Barbara Ellsworth at his death). It 
would also flip the entirety of the EFT's structure transfer structure (which utilized a 
specific list of personal property that Elmer chose not to pass to Barbara) on its head. 
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The trial court correctly recognized this folly, and Appellants' decision to reargue the 
point to this Court does not make their position any more valid. 
B. Had EFT owned the precious metals, Barbara's gift of the junk silver would have 
violated EFT's terms; Appellants' acceptance of the junk silver confirms that the 
precious metals were never part of EFT's trust estate. 
Appellants also cannot reconcile their own behavior with their proffered 
interpretation of the EFT' s and Will's terms. EFT' s "Section Seven: Distribution of the 
Trust Estate Upon Death of the First Trustor to Die" is very clear: until both trustors pass 
away, only the remaining living trustor (who is the sole primary beneficiary of EFT) is 
allowed to receive any distribution of Trust Estate income or principal. (R. at 1916, 
Exhibit 1 at pgs. 29-30.) According to§ 7.l(a), the remaining living trustor is the only 
individual that is allowed to receive "the entire net income" of EFT's family trust, as well 
as the only individual that is allowed to receive "as much of the principal of the family 
trust [is] necessary" for "the reasonable support and maintenance of the remaining living 
trustor." (R. at 1916, Exhibit 1 at pgs. 30-31.) According to § 7.1 (b ), the remaining living 
trustor is the only individual that is allowed to, during any calendar year, receive either 
$5,000 or five percent of the family trust's aggregate value. (Id.) Nowhere within Section 
Seven does any contingent beneficiary (or anyone else for that matter) have any right to 
receive any income or principal of EFT' s Trust Estate. 
Appellants do not dispute that they received an equally-divided portion of some of 
the precious metals stored in the safe in the marital home when they received their "gift" 
of the junk silver in January 2013. (R. at 624-5, 1083.) Barbara decided to divide and 
give away this junk silver because it was hers to freely give (since it was not part of the 
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Trust Estate). Such a gift, had the silver been part of EFT, would have been totally 
contrary to the language of EFT's Section Seven. Appellants cannot claim that, despite 
receiving this gratuity from Barbara, the remaining metals in the marital home's safe 
were somehow part of the Trust Estate. Clearly, EFT's provisions do not include the 
precious metals as part of the Trust Estate and everyone (including Appellants) 
understood the precious metals to be Barbara Ellsworth's separate property. 
C. 17ie trial court correctly applied the statut01y language of UC.A. § 7 5-3-102 and 
utilized Elmer's Will as evidence that Barbara was the rightful ovmer of the 
precious metals after Elmer's death. 
As the trial court recognized, "[a] plain reading of [Elmer's] Will explains that 
Barbara is to receive Elmer's personal property which was not transferred to someone 
else or to the family trust." (R. at 1070.) Appellants do not dispute "that Barbara 
possessed the Precious Metals after Elmer died." (Appellants' Brief at 14.) Because 
Elmer's Will was not probated, his Will was effective only as evidence of any devise by 
Elmer. The trial court correctly applied the provisions ofU.C.A. § 75-3-102 and utilized 
the Will to confinn that Barbara was the appropriate devisee of the precious metals. 
Utah law allows a trial court to utilize a will as "evidence of a devise" if (1) "no 
court proceeding concerning the succession or administration of [ a decedent's] estate has 
occurred" and (2) if the "devisee ... possessed the property devised in accordance with 
the provisions of the will." U.C.A. § 75-3-102. The trial court in this case followed this 
procedure and confirmed that, since Elmer's Will established Elmer's intention to 
transfer all of the personal property that he had not otherwise transferred in some other 
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manner to Barbara, Barbara's post-death possession of Ehner's personal property (more 
specifically, the precious metals) confinned her as the appropriate devisee. 
Appellants' position that the trial court erred when it relied upon Section 102 is 
incorrect. Appellants' further suggestion that the trial court should have heard parol 
evidence on Elmer's intent regarding the proper devisee of his personal property is 
untenable. Appellants never introduced any admissible parol evidence for the Court to 
consider (and have not identified any parol evidence within their brief to this Court). 
This, alone, confirms that their position is fatally flawed. There is no admissible 
evidence, anywhere, that the precious metals were to be transferred to EFT. The trial 
court applied a straightforward evidentiary statute in a straightforward manner when it 
utilized Elmer's Will as evidence of his devise of the precious metals to Barbara. No 
error occurred, and this Court should affirm the trial court's entry of partial summary 
judgment. 
II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL OVERCAME THE 
PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE. 
Appellants' second issue, that the Court's determination that "the evidence 
preponderates against a finding of unfairness" was incorrect solely because Barbara did 
not see the actual March 13, 2013 email that Mark sent to Terry, is simply not a viable 
basis for overturning the Court's decision. Appellants have not attempted to marshal the 
evidence, and their scant alternative theory is nothing more than speculation, given that 
there is no evidence on the record that Terry misled Barbara or failed to accurately 
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convey the content of the March 13 email. There is no basis to overturn the trial comi's 
finding that the Appellees overcame the presumption of undue influence. 
A. Appellants have failed to marshai the evidence. 
The trial court ultimately found that the evidence presented at trial "preponderates 
against a finding of unfairness" and that the Barbara May Ellsworth Trust was "not the 
result of undue influence." (R. at 1657.) To support these ultimate findings, the trial 
court, among many other things, found that the Barbara May Ellsworth Trust was 
prepared with the assistance of counsel, that the new estate plan reflected Barbara's own 
wishes, and that Barbara had her own personal motivations to seek to create a new estate 
plan. Furthennore, the trial comi found that Barbara understood "that she owned the 
[marital home] and that she wanted to sell that residence to a particular family," that she 
knew "what her property [was] and" was able to "fonnulate a plan for its disposition." 
(R. at 1661.) The trial comi specifically referenced both Mr. Skabelund's4 belief that 
Barbara did not lack testamentary capacity and Dr. Curzon's medical detennination that 
Barbara "was able to generally understand what was going on and make decisions 
concerning her assets." (R. at 1660-61.) 
These facts cannot simply be disregarded by the Appellants. The Appellants 
concede, when they set forth the explanation of the applicable standard of appellate 
review, that they "must show the trial comi's findings are clearly erroneous by 
marshaling all evidence supporting the finding, then showing the evidence is legally 
4 Mr. Skabelund had known Barbara and provided estate planning legal advice to her 
since 1991. (R. at 1682.) 
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insufficient to support the findings when viewed in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings." (Appellants' Brief at 3.) Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure requires that "[a] party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding." 
While the failure to marshal facts is no longer considered a procedural bar to 
consideration of an appellate issue, it is a vital element of any attempt to challenge a trial 
court's factual determination because "[t]he duty to marshal serves as a 'natural extension 
of an appellant's burden of persuasion."' Sinimons Media Group, LLC v. Tffaykar, LLC, 
2014 UT App 145, ,r 42, 335 P.3d 885 (quoting State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r 41, 326 
P.3d 645). Any "argument that does not fully acknowledge the evidence suppmting a 
finding of fact has little chance, as a matter of logic, of demonstrating that the finding 
lacked adequate factual support." Dillon v. Southern Mgmt. Corp. Ret. Trust, 2014 UT 
14, ,r 59,326 P.3d 656. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that no appellant can 
"demonstrate that the evidence supporting a factual finding falls short without giving a 
candid account of that evidence." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Marshaling evidence 
is the only way to "establish[] a basis for overcoming the healthy dose of deference owed 
to factual findings." Nielsen, 2014 UT 10 at ,r 41. 
Rather than demonstrate why the myriad fact findings that the trial court made are 
somehow incapable of providing a basis for the trial court's ultimate detennination that 
the Barbara May Ellsworth Trust was not procured through undue influence, Appellants 
focus on two discrete matters: (I) the actual fact that there was a six day window between 
Mark's email to Terry and the date on which Barbara signed the new trust documents and 
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(2) a new and unsubstantiated theory that Terry did not accurately convey the content of 
the email to Barbara. This is the very type of insular focus that Utah's Supreme Court has 
unequivocally declared to be insufficient to persuade an appellate court to overturn a trial 
court's fact findings. 
Appellants cannot simply propose some new, alternative theory (one that was not 
even explored at trial) in an attempt to overturn the trial court's factual finding. 
Appellants' theory-that Terry did not accurately convey the content of the email to 
Barbara and that Barbara acted only on what Terry had told her from that point on-fails 
on numerous bases. First, there is no evidence on the record that Terry misrepresented 
any part of the email to Barbara. Appellants simply point to Terry's overreaction to the 
email. However, her reaction to the email does not equate to a misrepresentation of the 
email's content. To this point, the trial court specifically made a point of confirming that, 
"[i]n the present matter, there is simply no showing of undue influence." (R. at 1659.) 
Rather than provide evidence to support any showing of undue influence, Appellants 
have created a new theory that has no evidentiary support. 
Second, Appellants' theory does not reconcile the fact that Mr. Skabelund also 
saw Mark's email and he, too, considered it a "threat." (R. at 1912, pgs. 158:20-159:4.) 
Mr. Skabelund met with Barbara on March 14 and on March 19 (both days were after 
Mark sent the email), and he discussed these very issues with Barbara. Appellants' 
position that Barbara only acted on what Terry told her is completely contradicted by the 
fact that Barbara met with Mr. Skabelund and followed his (not Terry's) advice. In fact, 
Terry testified that Barbara, upon learning of the email, stated "we better talk to Steve 
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Skabelund." (R. at 1912, p. 49:15-20.) Barbara's desire to discuss the email with Mr. 
Skabelund, as well as her collaboration with Mr. Skabelund about the email, 
demonstrates that Appellants' theory is not tenable. 
Third, Appellants' theory, which is based upon the unstated assumption that 
Barbara was an automaton that had no ability to think for herself, is contradicted by the 
testimony of both Mr. Skabelund and Dr. Curzon. Both Mr. Skabelund and Dr. Curzon 
recognized that Barbara understood and could communicate what she wanted. To simply 
posit, without any evidentiary support, that Barbara was only acting on what Terry told 
her is nothing more than speculation. 
B. There is no burden upon Appellees to prove any other facts related to Barbara 's 
understanding of Mark Ellsworth's March 13, 2013 e-mail. 
The Appellants' final point, that Appellees had some extraordinary burden to 
establish that Terry accurately conveyed the content of the email to Barbara, is also 
flawed. First, Appellants cite no legal authority to support such a position. Second, the 
evidence presented at trial supports the conclusion that Terry did accurately convey the 
content of the email to Barbara. 
At trial, Terry testified that she "explained to my mother about this email" and that 
she "didn't show it to her" because she "didn't want to upset her." (R. at 1912, p. 49:15-
20.) Terry also stated that Barbara was "very hurt that Mark would ask her to resign." 
(Id.) This testimony stands alone as the testimony regarding what Terry told Barbara 
about the email. 
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Despite this evidence, Appellants claim that "[ w ]hat Barbara heard, however, was 
Terry's understanding of a threat and demand." There is no basis for this assertion, 
especially because Terry specifically testified that Barbara understood that 1v1ark was 
asking~ not demanding, ti11at she resign. The evidence presented to the Court is that 
Barbara received an explanation of an email in which Mark asked that she resign as 
trustee. Such an explanation certainly fairly conveys what Mark stated in the email, 
where he specifically wrote "we believe that the best way to proceed is to have Barbara 
officially resign from the trust" and "I would suggest we both meet with Barbara to 
discuss this and have her sign a resignation." (R. at 1677-78; 1916, Exhibit 8.) 
Appellants have replaced their marshaling burden with a proffer of speculative 
theorizing that is contradicted by the evidence presented at trial. Appellants have not met 
their burden of persuasion to demonstrate that the trial court's findings were clearly 
erroneous. The trial court correctly addressed the presumption of undue influence, 
analyzed the facts, and detem1ined that the evidence overcame the presumption. 
Appellants have not presented anything to this Court that even approaches an adequate 
challenge to the trial court's method and ultimate deten11ination. Therefore, the trial 
court's findings should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants' attempts to reverse the trial court's summary judgment and trial court 
mlings fail. The trial court correctly interpreted and applied Elmer's Will, and the trial 
court's factual findings were well supported by the evidence presented at trial. 
Appellants' arguments present untenable alternatives to this Court, as they propose a 
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,.._j) 
contract definition that is clearly at odds with the Will and EFT's provisions and an 
undue influence theory that not only fails to reconcile the trial court's findings and the 
evidence presented at trial, but is based upon evidence that does not exist. This Court 
should uphold and affirm all aspects of the trial court's summary judgment and post-trial 
rulings, and Appellees respectfully request that it do so. 
DATED this 25th day of November 2015. 
Counsel for Appellees 
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